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1 INTRODUCTION 
Arguably one of the most seminal pieces work car-
ried out in the field of safety science over the last 30 
years is Barry Turner’s (1978) book ‘Man-Made 
Disasters’. As the title of the book suggests Turner 
proposed that organizational disasters should not be 
viewed as cataclysmic ‘Acts of God’ but as a ‘type’ 
of disaster which comes about as the result of ever 
complex processes and everyday interactions within 
socio-technical systems (Pidgeon & O’Leary 2000).  
As well as the concept that industrial disasters can 
be ‘man-made’, the book also introduced the notion 
of ‘Failure of Foresight’, that is that large-scale or-
ganizational accidents can have long incubation pe-
riods, during which early warning signs are either 
ignored or misunderstood. Crucially his research 
suggested that man-made disasters had precondi-
tions, which were common to all disasters. Disasters 
are not caused by people or technical issues in isola-
tion, but rather they arise by interactions between 
humans and elements of complex systems. As 
Macrae (2014) states “disasters are essentialy organ-
ised events. To occur, they typically require the sys-
tematic and prolonged neglect of warning signs and 
signals of danger”. As a result, ‘organisational igno-
rance’ (Smithson 1989), ‘organisational silence’ 
(Morrison and Milliken 2000) and ‘organisational 
blindness’ (Hopkins 2005) can prevent an organisa-
tion from heeding valuable early warning signs that 
could prevent disaster.   
Turner believed that it is the ‘social distribution 
of knowledge’ i.e. “shared beliefs, collective as-
sumptions, cultural norms and patterns of communi-
cation across organisations” (Macrae 2014) that can 
define how safe an organisation they are. The ‘slop-
py management’ (Turner 1994) of information and 
knowledge, that is failure to collect and interpret 
safety data across complex organisations, is often 
identified as a contributory factor to disaster. Despite 
the best efforts of those involved within safety-
critical industries, he believed that the safe operation 
of technological systems can be subverted by the 
‘normal processes of organisational life’.    
Turner’s (1978) work became the catalyst for ex-
tensive research into the nature of system safety and 
accident causation e.g. Reason (1990/7), Vaughn 
(1996) Turner and Pidgeon (1997) Weick and Sut-
cliffe (2007) etc. Turner (1978) developed a stage 
model to describe the ‘lifecycle’ of organisational 
disasters. He carried out a study of 84 accidents in 
1960s and 1970s and concluded that all accidents 
progress through the 6 stages outlined below: 
1 Culturally accepted beliefs about the world; 
norms set out in Laws, SOPS, regulations. 
2 Incubation period: accumulation of unnoticed 
events (Latent Failures) which are at odds with 
the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms 
for avoiding them. 
3 Precipitating event: degree of recognition of some 
Latent Failures; transformation of the general per-
ceptions of Stage 2. 
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sonnel. The study suggests that organisations settle into a new quasi-stationary equilibrium following disaster, 
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4 Onset: disaster, accident occurs; cultural collapse. 
5 Rescue and salvage following accident; first stage 
adjustment – recognition of immediate post-
collapse situation allows rescue/salvage to take 
place. 
6 Cultural re-adjustment: following inquiry, beliefs 
and norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained 
understanding of the world. 
As Rosenthal (1996) states in the foreword to the 2nd 
addition of Turner’s book:  “the strength of the mod-
el is in its clear-cut, firm statement of the factors 
which, in conjunction, make for the incubation of 
disaster and crisis: perceptual rigidities, information 
ambiguities, the disregard of rules and instructions, 
and, eventually, overconfidence and organizational 
arrogance…it is as simple as it is powerful”.  
Following Turner other models have followed 
e.g. Shrivastava et al (1988) Industrial Crises Mod-
el, Toft and Reynolds (1997) Systems Failure and 
Cultural Readjustment Model, Ibrahim et al’s (2002) 
Pre-condition Phase Model and Aini and Razi’s 
(2006) model based on ten phases, all of which show 
that disasters follow a sequential stage/phase devel-
opment process. Hughes et al (2010) analysed disas-
ters in six different industries (space, shipping, avia-
tion, mining, rail and nuclear) to produce a Generic 
Disaster Pathway model. The model maps the path-
way of a disaster through four phases in relation to 
severity. Despite more recent work on stage models 
e.g. Elliot (2009), Turner’s original 6-stage model 
still stands out because of its simplicity.  
Turner (1978) provided a great deal of detail re-
garding disaster incubation and onset but had less to 
say about cultural readjustment. Pidgeon accepts this 
in the updated version of Turner’s book stating “im-
plicit in the original model then, is the assumption 
that such readjustment can and will take place typi-
cally as some form of organisational learning” 
(Turner & Pidgeon 1997). Organisational learning 
may be defined as “a cumulative, reflective and satu-
rating process through which all personnel within 
organisations learn to understand and continually re-
interpret the world in which they work by means of 
the organisational experiences to which they are ex-
posed” (Toft and Reynolds 1997). 
Elliott and Smith (2006) challenge Turner’s 
(1978) implicit assumption that cultural readjust-
ment automatically follows a crisis by examining the 
UK football industry’s response to four crises that 
affected it between 1946 and 1989. They concluded 
that despite the high profile mass casualties, public 
inquiries and legislative reform, little cultural read-
justment had taken place. This was in part due to 
what Wicks (2001) described as a ‘mindset of invul-
nerability’. What is clear is that the increasing com-
plexity of socio-technical systems has resulted in an 
expansive safety research tradition. Despite this, the 
pre-disaster, disaster and post-disaster literature is 
unbalanced with less emphasis placed on the post-
disaster phases. 
1.1 Aims and objectives 
The first objective was to examine a recent disaster, 
the 2006 Nimrod Crash and interpret it through the 
lens of Turner’s model focusing on Stage 6, cultural 
readjustment. The second objective was to reflect on 
the model in light of the data gathered and consider 
the implications for future work. 
1.2 Nimrod Crash and Haddon-Cave Inquiry 
On 2 September 2006, RAF Nimrod XV230 was on 
a routine mission over Helmand Province in South-
ern Afghanistan in support of NATO and Afghani 
ground forces, when she suffered a catastrophic mid-
air fire, which led to the total loss of the aircraft and 
the death of all 14 personnel on board. The subse-
quent Public Inquiry carried out by Charles Haddon-
Cave, QC was released after a 20-month investiga-
tion. The scale of the investigation was unprecedent-
ed in British military history. Haddon-Cave (2009) 
concluded that: “Financial pressures...drove a cas-
cade of multifarious organisational changes...which 
led to a dilution of the airworthiness regime within 
the  MOD and distraction from safety and air-
worthiness issues”. 
The Nimrod Review represented one of the big-
gest triggers for change within the RAF since the 
end of the Cold War. It set in motion a host organi-
zational changes, which took place in the context of 
busy operational activity in Afghanistan and Libya at 
a time of defence cuts. The RAF continues to be 
busy operationally in the Middle East today. This 
study aims to examine the perceptions and attitudes 
of RAF personnel following the fatal loss of the 
Nimrod and the subsequent Public Inquiry. The main 
focus of the research will be surrounding the “cul-
tural re-adjustment” of the organisation in light of 
previous research e.g. Turner (1978); Birkland 
(2009) barriers and facilitators; Dekker (2007) just 
culture and Elliott (2009) organizational memory 
and learning. 
Haddon-Cave’s subtitle to the ‘Nimrod Review’ 
was “A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP, CULTURE 
AND PRIORITIES” which gives an insight into the 
report’s candid assessment of the MOD’s failings. 
The wide ranging inquiry outlined many similarities 
between the loss of the Nimrod and other cata-
strophic accidents such as the Zebrugge Disaster 
(1987), King’s Cross Fire (1987), The Marchioness 
(1989), and BP Texas City (2005). The report high-
lighted the MOD’s shortcomings including a failure 
to adhere to basic principles; a military airworthiness 
system that was not fit for purpose; a safety case re-
gime that was ineffective and wasteful; an inade-
quate appreciation of the needs of aged aircraft; a se-
ries of weaknesses in the area of personnel; an unsat-
isfactory relationship between the MOD and indus-
try; an unacceptable procurement process leading to 
serial delays and cost-overruns and a safety culture 
that allowed business to eclipse airworthiness. There 
were 84 recommendations the most striking of 
which was for a new military airworthiness regime 
under the control of an independent Military Air-
worthiness Authority (MAA), “which is effective, 
relevant and understood, which properly addresses 
Risk to Life, and which drives new attitudes, behav-
iours, and a new Safety Culture” (Haddon-Cave 
2009). The report made recommendations for a Safe-
ty Culture comprising of a Reporting Culture, a Just 
Culture, a Flexible Culture, a Learning Culture, and 
a Questioning Culture. 
2 METHODS OF STUDY 
A longitudinal study was carried out using a number 
of different research methods including participant 
observation, documentation analysis and participant 
interview. The interview phase of the study was car-
ried out between May 2010 and Mar 2011 (Phase 1) 
and follow up interviews carried out Apr/May 2016 
(Phase 2) at RAF Waddington, a frontline base in 
Lincolnshire.  
2.1 Participants 
Participants were all volunteers and were selected by 
the researcher from across the organisation. Purpos-
ive sampling was used to ensure that sufficient rep-
resentation was provided across the range of trades 
and rank structure. The majority of the interviews 
were with personnel of Sergeant or higher rank 
where the impact of the Nimrod Report was thought 
most likely to be felt and with those personnel with a 
direct safety role. These therefore represent low-
er/middle management and above. For Phase 2, the 
precise definition of some of the participant roles 
had changed since 2011 however the majority of the 
interviewees were employed in very similar roles to 
the original interviewees. Four of the participants 
who were interviewed in 2011 had taken part in 
2016.  
2.2 Phase 1 
During this time the researcher was employed in the 
RAF and worked at RAF Waddington. Having spent 
24 years as an engineer working on a number of dif-
ferent aircraft types, the researcher was uniquely 
placed as a participant-observer to carry out an ob-
servational study of RAF Waddington’s personnel.  
A total of 30 semi-structured interviews were carried 
out during Jan-Mar 2011. The researcher also ob-
served reactions to the Haddon-Cave Inquiry at a 
large number of Aviation Safety Meetings and Inter-
national Symposiums at a variety of locations both 
inside and outside RAF Waddington over the period 
Oct 2009 – Mar 2013. The researcher had access to a 
wide variety of (published and unpublished) docu-
ments that give insight into the safety culture both at 
RAF Waddington and in the wider RAF before, dur-
ing and after publication of the Haddon-Cave (2009) 
Report. These included: 
− Error Management Diagnostic (EMD) - 828 ques-
tionnaires completed by Engineering and Logis-
tics personnel.  
− Safety Culture Assessment (2010) - cultural study 
based on the Health and Safety Executive’s Cli-
mate Tool. 
− Maintenance Error Management System (MEMS) 
End of Year Report (2010) - end of year summary 
of MEMS across 12 RAF Stations.  
− Aviation Safety Management Plan  
− No1 Group, No. 2 Group, RAF Kinloss, RAF 
Waddington draft Safety Manuals. 
− Command Continuous Improvement Maturity as-
sessment. 
2.3 Phase 2 
A further 21 interviews were carried out Mar-May 
2016. By 2016 safety management documentation 
had become clearer and more formalised:  
− RAF Safety Management Plan (AP8000)  
− No1 Group Functional Safety and Environmental 
Management Plan 
− No 1 Group Air Safety Management Plan 
− RAF Waddington Total Safety Management Plan  
In addition to follow up interviews and document 
analysis the researcher took part as observer-
participant in a three day, contractor-led Defence 
Aviation Error Management System (DAEMS) Post 
Technical Support visit to RAF Cranwell. A number 
of focus groups, master classes and interviews were 
held with over 100 personnel from across all ranks, 
as well as civilian support contractors.  
2.4 Data Analysis 
Interviews were recorded and subsequently tran-
scribed. The data was manually analysed to identify 
themes. A set of a priori codes were produced based 
on the interview schedule headings and sub head-
ings. An iterative approach was taken to analysing 
and re-analysing the data set to further develop these 
codes as new themes and sub-themes emerged fol-
lowing the process outlined by Miles and Huberman 
(1994).  
3 RESULTS 
 
Participant responses were organized around the fol-
lowing broad categories: 
− Nimrod Crash: Awareness / Views of the incident 
− Nimrod Review: Awareness / Understanding of 
report recommendations 
− Personal Impact: Of event / Of subsequent chang-
es  
− Organisational Impact: Risk / Likelihood of reoc-
currence / Safety Campaigns / New Structure & 
New Roles / Fear of litigation  
− Culture: Military / Learning / Questioning / Just / 
Reporting 
− Barriers to change 
− Facilitators of change 
3.1 After Nimrod – Awareness and Impact 
All participants had some knowledge of the Nimrod 
crash and Inquiry to a greater or lesser extent and all 
could identify structural changes that had occurred. 
Most perceived that Nimrod had been the catalyst for 
change in a positive way although by the latter stages 
some thought that complacency was starting to creep 
in. In the immediate aftermath many thought that the 
organisation was vulnerable to another event. By 
2016 most thought that the management of Air-
worthiness and Air Safety had “enough momentum 
now to endure”. 
There was some early evidence that people be-
lieved the organisation had become risk averse, part-
ly in response to a perception of a greater chance of 
litigation. The narrative shifted over time and many 
people stated, “we are not a risk-averse organisa-
tion”. Some however, felt that the pendulum had 
swung back and statements such as this could be 
used as ‘cover’ for not digging too deeply into safety 
concerns; and by implication allowing managers to 
‘push on’: “I think initially safety comes first but 
then when the pressure comes…safety maybe isn't 
the full priority”. Risk management (RM) is an area 
that appears misunderstood by much of the organisa-
tion and when mitigations and barriers are docu-
mented as reducing risks to an acceptable level, their 
efficacy is not routinely tested. Post Haddon-Cave 
RM is largely still narrowly focused on Air Safety 
(Risk to Life). Functional risks appear less well un-
derstood. 
Prior to Haddon-Cave, Waddington had a very 
disparate approach to aviation safety where different 
types of safety were managed by different parts of 
the organization. Some upheaval and apparent dis-
comfort was felt when existing roles and responsibil-
ities were ‘challenged’ by the new procedures and 
processes after Haddon-Cave. Over time there has 
been an attempt to align the disparate areas under 
one Total Safety (TS) construct. Although this was 
seen to be a step in the right direction, it was per-
ceived to be having a limited effect due to a lack of 
real integration of safety expertise and assurance ac-
tivity. There is considerable overlap in some areas 
and apparent gaps in others. There was evidence of 
spending more time carrying out assurance-building 
schemas and processes than investigating issues. “I 
think we may have gone a little bit too far right of 
arc with regard to the amount of assurance that we 
are doing; to the point that we are doing so much as-
surance with limited manpower…that we are spend-
ing more time pushing paperwork than digging into 
the nitty gritty and actually finding out what could be 
going wrong”. Additionally, safety management 
leadership was felt to be evolving ‘bottom-up’ not 
centrally driven. 
Some that safety has become a ‘cottage industry’ 
‘sucking’ life away from the frontline: “There is 
more governance; the big joke now is that you have 
more people assuring than turning spanners…” Au-
dit fatigue and SMS processes were seen as a burden 
although most people agreed that the new assurance 
processes were necessary. Increased engineering 
oversight in particular was largely seen as a good 
thing. The reporting culture was perceived to be 
good and improving all the time although it was seen 
by some as a way to ‘protect’ individuals when 
something had gone wrong. Some saw this as a way 
of ‘passing the buck’ or getting top-cover for risky 
behaviours. The myriad of different reporting sys-
tems had caused confusion in the user community 
and led some to worry that significant safety issues 
might be falling through the cracks. Reporting sys-
tems matured to some extent over time and partici-
pants seemed happier that people knew how to re-
port. Local workarounds were helping to overcome 
the wider systemic problem of a lack of integration. 
Despite some middle management disquiet about: 
“airing our dirty linen in public” the majority recog-
nized the benefits of learning from other people’s 
mistakes.  
3.2 Barriers and Facilitators 
The British military are often described as having a 
‘can-do’ mentality but some participants felt that 
‘getting the job done’ often meant cutting corners, 
coming up with ‘workarounds’; not following the 
written procedures. A reluctance to be seen as some-
one who does not ‘get the job done’, was seen to be 
due to an organisational culture of ‘achieving’ and 
‘problem solving’, but also because of fear of detri-
mental impact on careers.  There were examples of 
situations where individuals had decided to say, 
“stop” but these were perceived to be isolated inci-
dents where things had got so bad that to continue 
would have been foolhardy. The normalization and 
transfer of risk-taking from war-fighting theatres 
back to peacetime operations in the UK was also 
seen as a potential barrier to safety. The majority felt 
that operational needs would always come before 
safety.  
Perceived pressure from above was felt by many 
of the more junior managers but was in contradiction 
of the stated intent of the senior managers to put 
safety first. A widely held belief is that resource-to-
task is inadequate. “I am worried that we are being 
asked to do more and more with less and less; some-
thing’s got to give”. Most people believed that there 
was “no fat left” and often they are ‘double or triple 
hatted’ i.e. doing several roles. There also appears to 
be ‘gapped’ posts in some key safety areas. Reserv-
ists are increasingly being used to overcome the dis-
ruption caused by ‘churn’ and to give stability to key 
safety roles and to overcome the loss of corporate 
memory, which is exacerbated by immature data-
bases and almost non-existent data analysis / exploi-
tation. Manpower for safety and airworthiness was 
being resourced at the expense of, or putting pres-
sure on front line activity. Some pointed out the dif-
ficulties of competing demands of EITHER getting 
the job done OR being safe. The major reason that 
people were perceived to be using workarounds was 
because they didn’t believe that they had enough 
people to do the job properly. Most still saw safety 
activity as a burden that could get in the way of out-
put but a ‘necessary-evil’. 
Lack of understanding and resistance to change 
were seen as significant barriers to cultural adjust-
ment. Over time there seems to be less concern that 
individual ‘blockers’ were trying to undermine the 
system however a recurring theme was that progress 
COULD be and HAD been hampered when a man-
ager is posted in that does not whole heartedly com-
mit to the new paradigm. Politics and career progres-
sion were often perceived to be management’s main 
drivers rather than system performance.  
Organizational inflexibility and the hierarchical 
structure of the MOD were perceived to be holding 
back progress: “When you look at a safety culture; 
the whole idea of it being flexible, learning, report-
ing and just and all that stuff. Okay we may be get-
ting there on some of that stuff but flexible organiza-
tion? I don't think we are as the military; a learning 
organization? Well I don't think that either. I don't 
think we are flat enough to learn properly. So the 
things that we learn at the grassroots don't actually 
get to high-level, to a high enough level to get into 
policy. So as an organization we don't particularly 
learn well”. 
The main facilitator for change identified by the 
participants was ‘Leadership’ both by the Station 
Commander and the MAA. Whilst no one ques-
tioned the Station Commander’s commitment, few 
felt that the MAA as a relatively new organisation 
was entirely capable yet of providing the direction 
and guidance required. Many felt that Waddington 
was influencing Command Policy ‘bottom-up’ and 
few people understood what the RAF Safety Centre 
was for. Most were reasonably happy with local 
leadership however also some scepticism about the 
RAF’s higher echelons being really committed to 
safety: “It is about safety leadership. You read the 
stuff in AP 8000, statement of commitment or what-
ever and it is strong & signed off at the right level. I 
am not sure it is actually understood at that level. 
You sign off what is presented before you but you 
don't necessarily understand what you are signing 
for; you agree with it but you don't necessarily un-
derstand it in depth”  
There was a sense that despite difficulties, the or-
ganisation had a sufficiently motivated workforce 
that could quickly adapt to the new safety regime. 
Evidence to support this can be seen by the fact that 
over 1000 Aviation Error Management System 
(AEMS) reports were submitted across the RAF in 
the 12-month period after Haddon-Cave, compared 
to 10 reports submitted in 2008 under the previous 
reporting system, a hundred-fold increase. The re-
porting rates continued to grow throughout this study 
at a rate of about 10% increase year-on-year. As well 
as underpinning an improved learning and safety 
culture, personnel commented that open reporting 
overcame individual ‘blockers’ in the system as 
there was now: “No place to hide…” 
Although a burden, many personnel felt that the 
mandatory Safety and Human Factors Awareness 
training would facilitate the implementation of the 
Haddon-Cave recommendations and fostering of a 
Safety Culture. Other factors identified as facilitating 
culture change include System Confidence and De-
monstrable Success.  
3.3 Safety Culture 
Participants were all aware of at least two of the 
structural changes that had come about as a result of 
Haddon-Cave (2009). The findings of the EMD con-
trast with the findings of Phase 1 of this research 
some 18 months later by which time 150+ AEMS 
forms had been submitted and 27 Occurrence Safety 
Investigations (OSIs) carried out at Waddington; 
representing a willingness to report individual as 
well as system errors.  
A key concept now established is the notion of 
SQEP (Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person-
nel) for those personnel with important safety and 
risk management roles. This represents a significant 
challenge to the established way that personnel are 
managed throughout the organisation. Although the 
Station Commander is now legally accountable as 
the Duty Holder for the aviation risks on station they 
have little or no control over the personnel that work 
in key safety roles. Most SQEP were not formally 
selected for their safety expertise prior to coming in-
to post and most had to qualify after starting the job. 
There appears to be no over-arching strategy for 
‘growing’ SQEP. It was also noted that key safety 
people tend to be “the sick and the lame” i.e. those 
who cannot be deployed due to medical or other per-
sonal reasons. Many of the participants thought that 
individuals throughout the organisation were now 
more questioning of themselves and others; “Con-
sciously I probably look at the things I do when I get 
into an aircraft…slightly more than I did before”. 
Despite assertions from senior management such 
as about commitment to a Just Culture, the quote be-
low accurately paraphrases a common view voiced 
during the first part of this study. “I think there is 
still the culture of headhunting; when something 
goes wrong we still try to find someone to blame”. 
Personnel appear sceptical until exposed to specific 
examples or until they are personally involved in an 
incident and subsequently find that blame is not, in-
appropriately attributed. Some thought that individu-
als would be able ‘hide’ behind the policy and there-
fore ‘get away with’ behaviour that should be 
punished. One high profile incident had set progress 
back significantly in Phase 2. 
There was a general feeling that the RAF used to 
have a safety culture in place but that they had taken 
their ‘eye off the ball’ “I think the priority was shift-
ed, the focus was on saving money” Some felt 
though that there were signs of improvement, partic-
ularly with the management and understanding of 
risk however, there was a sense that in other ways 
the organisation was still “carrying on as before” 
particularly on operations and that hierarchical struc-
tures and historical trade boundaries stand in the way 
of the organisation becoming a flexible, learning or-
ganisation. There has been no fundamental shift in 
the way that the organisation is structured and trying 
to meet the aims of Haddon-Cave without properly 
resourcing it had, some felt, built in more, unneces-
sary complexity.  “In terms of trying to deliver in the 
short-term, maybe just modifying what you already 
got is the simplest and cheapest option, and also in 
terms of delivering change anything bigger may have 
been met with increased opposition. So it might be a 
case of trying to do what you can rather than what 
you need to do” There was evidence of perceived 
pressure from above however many thought that 
self-induced pressure was probably more of a con-
cern. “We don’t like to fail”. It seems that Can-do 
persists for many and that short cuts and worka-
rounds are still used to achieve output when the 
‘heat’ is on.    
4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 Structural and Cultural Adjustment 
Whilst there have been some structural changes at 
RAF Waddington, it is not immediately obvious 
whether they have gone far enough in order to foster 
a really open and engaged safety culture. There are a 
number of positive cultural indicators that suggest 
improvement, however there are also some funda-
mental challenges that may be holding back pro-
gress, and may even be making things worse. There 
is a weary acceptance by many of Waddington’s 
staff that the structure of the organisation will forev-
er be in a state of constant reorganisation to accom-
modate the lack of people, or to satisfy individual 
middle/senior management agendas. Major reorgani-
sation (though not fundamental) has put strain on 
frontline capabilities because it was not resourced. 
This has been addressed to a lesser extent by em-
ploying reservists but this is a drop in the ocean 
compared to what may be required. The bureaucracy 
of safety management is clear to see and growing but 
whether this flurry of safety activity masks the true 
nature of Waddington’s risks is not obvious to an 
outside observer or even to those involved. Most 
participants agreed that the organisation was safer in 
the wake of Haddon-Cave but few thought that they 
were as safe as they should be. 
It is clear that the participants do not yet think 
that the organisation has found the right balance 
when it comes to RM. Emergent hazards and risks 
do not appear to be hunted down as RM is narrowly 
focused after Haddon-Cave. There has been an at-
tempt to widen the field of focus but this creates two 
problems: For some straying away from Haddon-
Cave’s core principles dilutes efficacy. For others 
targeting too narrowly risks placing too much em-
phasis on one particular aspect of safety at the ex-
pense of the real issues that may be hurting the or-
ganisation. The fear of reoccurrence noted in Phase 
1 hasn’t been lost…although this does not necessari-
ly mean that disaster is inevitable since a heightened 
sense of unease may help to overcome complacency 
as in high reliability/resilient organisations. It may 
now mean that the organisation is more risk-aware. 
The danger of course could be that this ‘fear’ only 
resides within enlightened individuals who may be 
insufficiently empowered to make a difference.  
So has full cultural readjustment taken place as 
suggested by Turner’s (1978) model? It is clear that 
some progress has been made but that the picture is a 
mixed one. This research may raise more questions 
than it answers about whether cultural readjustment 
is even possible, whether foresight can or will be 
generated, or whether disaster is inevitable in highly 
complex socio-technical organisations.  
4.2 Safety Culture 
As Haddon-Cave (2009) points out “There is much 
to be learned from the work of NASA and the US 
Joint Planning and Development Office who have 
adopted Professor James Reason’s four-part ap-
proach to creating an “Engaged” Safety Culture 
which includes four elements: Reporting / Just / 
Flexible / Learning. Haddon-Cave added a fifth cul-
ture to this list and this has been included in the RAF 
SMP (AP8000). He believed that a Questioning Cul-
ture was also fundamental. In the seven years since 
Haddon-Cave personnel at RAF Waddington have 
shown an increasing willingness to report accidents, 
incidents and near misses. This is mirrored across 
the wider MOD.  
Once given the training, processes and mecha-
nisms to report, personnel began to highlight prob-
lems to management that had been unknown to them 
under the previous command-chain and accident re-
porting systems. However there are issues: too many 
reporting systems, some underpinned by mandatory 
legislative requirements. Confusion has resulted in 
some mandatory reportable incidents being reported 
on the wrong system, or not reported at all; insuffi-
cient occurrence investigators available to carry out 
investigations; reporting systems seen as too un-
wieldy and difficult to use; differing perceptions as 
to what some reporting systems are for; perception 
that some of the reporting systems are more ‘visible’ 
to senior management, fostering the notion of too 
much outside interference; the view of “airing dirty 
linen” has waned over the years but still encoun-
tered; a belief from some that personnel may ‘abuse’ 
the system and report to ‘offload’ difficult manage-
ment issues;  quality of reports varies significantly 
regarding their value for hazard identification;  belief 
that ‘others’ report to protect themselves when carry-
ing out risky behaviours to protect themselves from 
accountability; embryonic data analysis and “doing 
what we can” within resource constraints.  
There is wide spread recognition that Waddington 
is striving to be ‘just’ and fair when things go wrong 
(Dekker, 2007) but it is not yet fully embedded. The 
sentiment that Just Culture is ‘hard-won but easily 
lost’ was voiced time and again. Where formal safe-
ty investigations are carried out the belief is widely 
held that people will be treated fairly and appropri-
ately. Outside of these investigations doubt still re-
mains. The complexity of RAF Waddington and 
wider MOD as an organisation, makes being flexible 
extremely difficult. Constraints on finance, infra-
structure, recruitment and manning, policy and mate-
riel all act to narrow the options available. Although 
some involved in Waddington’s SMS have a vision 
of what their organisation could look like, this does 
not seem to be mirrored at a strategic level in the 
MOD. No one interviewed could articulate or point 
to a high level vision or strategy for growing safety 
management expertise or fostering a safety culture.  
The basic organisational command structure and 
hierarchy still exists and the organisation still pro-
cures and operates in much the same way as it did 
before the Nimrod crash. The researcher had an op-
portunity to talk to Haddon-Cave after he gave a 
speech at the Royal Aeronautical Society in 2015 
where he stated his belief that the MAA was on 
course to be a world class regulatory body. This 
view was not widely held by Waddington’s person-
nel. The move towards even more contractor support 
seems unstoppable regardless of what impact this 
may have on the RAF’s skills base and corporate 
knowledge. 
At the present time there is limited expertise 
throughout the organisation at interrogating and ana-
lysing safety data and few people have the time to 
even begin to look proactively at the increasing vol-
ume of data. The taxonomies used to categorise this 
data vary considerably and reside in different data-
bases; therefore gaining situational awareness of the 
current risk picture appears to be more about intui-
tion than empirical evidence. Studies of organiza-
tional memory have shown the link to organizational 
learning so the lack of a joined up approach to the 
management and exploitation of safety data, and the 
churn of personnel may negatively affect corporate 
memory and therefore the ability to learn. Differing 
emphases of investigative approach e.g. identifying 
‘causal factor’ versus ‘root cause’ can lead to single 
rather than double loop learning.  
Military personnel and officers in particular are 
trained to ‘deal with’ issues however this approach 
may only treat the symptom rather than the cause 
and reduces the opportunity for isomorphic learning 
to take place. Organisational learning and error pre-
vention can only come about when we ‘drain the 
swamps’ (Reason, 1990). Middle management in 
particular appear to be vulnerable to this mind-set. 
The elephant in the room for the RAF to become a 
learning organisation appears to be its military cul-
ture of can-do and a hierarchical structure where is-
sues are dealt with lower down so the real risk pic-
ture is potentially ‘filtered out’ before reaching those 
that can influence policy. Policy appears to be 
changing and ‘bubbling up’ from the bottom. The 
question remains whether the organisation is ham-
strung by its structure, culture and external factors 
such that it can only progress so far; can perhaps on-
ly be so safe. Despite some obvious examples of in-
dividual resistance to change there appears to be a 
willingness on the part of the population to prevent 
another disaster. Nimrod remains in the psyche of 
many of the interviewees although it seems that the 
event itself is less significant to the younger workers. 
The lack of awareness in this cohort may not repre-
sent a vulnerability as they seem willing to report 
and the safety management system processes appear 
to be more ‘daily business’ than in the earlier part of 
the study. 
5 REFLECTIONS ON TURNER’S MODEL 
It is clear from this research that cultural readjust-
ment is a many-layered, recursive process of change. 
It involves a complex mix of Contemplation, Prepa-
ration and Action (Prochaska et al 1992) at individu-
al, team and organisational level. This is fraught 
with difficulty. Even when public inquiries are effec-
tive at identifying the causes of disaster, they still 
have to make appropriate recommendations that 
must be achievable and grounded in reality. Disas-
ters are uncomfortable events to go through for any 
organization and so is the subsequent adjustment. 
This change needs to be managed to be effective. It 
can’t just ‘happen’ by ticking off a list of recom-
mendations post inquiry. When change does occur 
there will be many factors that work for and against 
and sometimes making structural changes are the 
easiest thing to do. These, along with the inevitable 
flurry of safety activity may give the illusion of safe-
ty through increased safety bureaucracy. Improved 
safety culture takes time to achieve and individuals 
and teams will go through the process of Contempla-
tion, Preparation and Action at different times and at 
different paces. Individuals (whether as heralds or 
blockers) can have a profound influence on the effi-
cacy of this process. When the dust settles the organ-
isation may well find that a culture shift has oc-
curred, however only time will tell whether the new 
norms and beliefs have made it safer. Even then 
there will be ongoing disrupting factors that mean 
that rather than an end-state of “cultural readjust-
ment” organisations are more likely to settle into a 
new quasi-stationary equilibrium (Lewin 1947a). 
Turner’s (1978) model does not easily account for 
the findings of this research. In fact no stage model 
can easily sum up the complexity or recursive nature 
of cultural readjustment therefore more work is re-
quired.  
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Although this research took place over an extended 
period of time it was still limited in its sample size 
and scope therefore extrapolating to the wider organ-
ization or other industries may be difficult. Addi-
tionally the researcher was inevitably involved in the 
changes that took place in the wake of Haddon-Cave 
and therefore maybe too close to be entirely objec-
tive. Future work could involve revisiting the RAF 
to carry out a third phase and to carry out a similar 
case study in another safety critical industry e.g. 
Rail. The data from this study and future work will 
be used to develop a model that may better describe 
the process of cultural readjustment. 
7 REFERENCES 
Aini, M.S. and Razi, A.F., 2010. Development of socio-
technical disaster model. Safety Science 48(10): 1286-1295. 
Birkland T.A. 2009. Disasters, lessons learned and fantasy 
documents. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Manage-
ment 17 (3): 146-156. 
Dekker, S. 2007. Just Culture. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Elliott, D. & Smith, D. 2006. Cultural readjustment after crisis: 
regulation and learning from crisis within the UK soccer in-
dustry. Journal of Management Studies 43(2): 291–318. 
Elliot, D. 2009. The failure of organizational learning from cri-
sis – a matter of life and death? Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management 17(3): 156-168. 
Haddon-Cave, C. 2009. The Nimrod Review: An independent 
review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the 
RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006. 
London: HMSO.  
Hopkins A. 2005. Safety, culture and risk: The organizational 
causes of disasters. Sydney: CCH. 
Hughes, C et al. 2010. Bad stars or guiding lights? Learning 
from disasters to improve patient safety. Quality and Safety 
in Health Care 19 (4): 332–6. 
Ibrahim, M and Razi, A.F. 2002. Technological man-made dis-
aster precondition phase model for major accidents. Disas-
ter Prevention and Management 11(5): 380 – 388. 
Lewin, K. 1947a. Frontiers in group dynamics. In D. Cart-
wright (ed.), Field Theory in Social Science. London: So-
cial Science Paperbacks. 
Macrae C. 2014. Early warnings, weak signals and learning 
from healthcare disasters. BMJ Quality and Safety  23: 
440–445.  
Miles, M. & Huberman, A. M. 1994. Qualitative data anal- 
ysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.  
Morrison, E.W. & Miliken, F. J. 2000. Organizational silence: 
A barrier to change and development in a pluralistic world. 
The Academy of Management Review 25: 706–725. 
Pidgeon, N. & O’Leary, M. 2000. Man-made disasters: why 
technology and organizations (sometimes) fail. Safety Sci-
ence 34: 15–30. 
Prochaska, J.O. et al. 1992. In search of how people change: 
applications to addictive behaviors. American Psychologist. 
47:1102–14  
Reason, J. T. 1990. Human Error. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Reason, J.T. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Ac-
cidents. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Rosenthal, U. 1996. Foreward. In Turner, B.A. & Pidgeon, N. 
1997. Man-Made Disasters (2nd edn). Oxford: Butterworth 
Heinemmann. 
Shrivastava, P. et al. 1988. Understanding industrial crises. 
Journal of Management Studies 25 (4): 285–304. 
Smithson, M. 1989. Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging 
Paradigms. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Toft, B. & Reynolds, S. 1997. Learning from Disasters. A 
Management Approach (2nd edn). Leicester: Perpetuity 
Press. 
Turner, B.A. 1978. Man-made Disasters. London: Wykeham. 
Turner B. 1994. Causes of disaster: sloppy management. Brit-
ish Journal of Management 5: 215–219. 
Turner, B.A. & Pidgeon, N. 1997. Man-Made Disasters (2nd 
edn). Oxford: Butterworth Heinemmann. 
Vaughan, D. 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision. Risk 
Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Weick, K. E. & Sutcliffe, K. M. 2007. Managing the Unex-
pected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, 
(2nd edn.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.  
Wicks, D. 2001. Institutionalized mindsets of invulnerability: 
Differentiated institutional fields and the antecedents of or-
ganizational crisis. Organization Studies 22: 659–692.  
